108
AJITH KULATUNGA
v.
SHIROMALA
COURT OF APPEAL.
WIGNESWARAN, J.
TILAKAWARDANE, J.
C.A. NO. 651/98(F)
D.C. Embilipitiya 4966/1)
October 31, 2000
Matrimonial Action - Nullity - Breakdown of the marriage -Non consummation of
the marriage - Divorce on the ground of desertion not pleaded as a cause of
action - Can the Court of Appeal grant a Divorce?
The Plaintiff - Appellant filed action for declaration of nullity and for
the dissolution of the Marriage. The Defendant - Respondent moved for the
dismissal of the action. The District Court dismissed the Plaintiff's action.
On appeal, it was contended that -
(a) That the Trial Judge had considered only the prayer relating to nullity but
not the application for dissolution of marriage;
(b) The Trial Judge failed to consider the complete breakdown of the marriage;
(c) The Trial Judge failed to consider the fact of non-consummation of the
marriage;
(e) That the Court had a discretion to grant a divorce;
Held :
(1) There was evidence placed before the original court that there were
adequate grounds to grant a divorce, if divorce on the ground of malicious
desertion, constructive or otherwise was pleaded as a cause of action;
superficially there is in fact a prayer for the grant of a divorce.
(2) 1. It appears that there had been a complete breakdown of the marriage after
registration.
2. Except for the signing of the certificate of marriage parties had not lived
together.
3. The amended plaint had not placed alternative causes of action, the averments
dealt with nullity only. However the second prayer in the amended plaint dealt
with the granting of a Divorce.
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4. The parties are desirous to
end their marital bond with no possibility of reconciliation whatsoever in
sight.
Appeal from the Judgment of the District Court of Embilipitiya.
Cases referred to :
1. H. John Perera us H. Mathupali - 71 NLR 461
2. Lawry us Lawry - 1967 - 1 WLR 789 at 791
Jayatissa Herath for Plaintiff - Appellant.
W. Dayaratne for Defendant - Respondent.
Cur. adv. cult.
October 31, 2000.
WIGNESWARAN, J.
The Plaintiff-Appellant filed this action for declaration of nullity and for
the dissolution of the marriage entered on 23.01.1992 between the Plaintiff and
the Defendant.
The Defendant-Respondent moved for the dismissal of the action and for costs of
action.
By judgment dated 23.07.1998 the District Judge, Embilipitiya dismissed the
Plaintiffs action awarding costs of action to the Defendant-Respondent.
This was an appeal against the said judgment dated 23.07.1998.
On 19.06.2000 a settlement was reached between parties wherein the Plaintiff
Appellant and Defendant-Respondent together with their respective
Attorneys-at-Law signed a document containing terms of settlement consenting to
a declaration of nullity and waiving costs of action ordered in the judgment
dated 23.07.1998.
This Court rejected the said settlement.
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Thereafter written submissions
have been filed by the learned Counsel for Plaintiff- Appellant wherein he has
submitted as follows:
(i) The learned District Judge had considered only prayer relating to nullity
but not the application for dissolution of marriage.
(ii) The learned District Judge had failed to consider the complete breakdown of
the marriage between parties.
(iii) The learned District Judge had failed to consider the fact that there had
been no consummation of the marriage.
(iv) The Defendant did not give evidence and she did not contradict the fact of
the breakdown of the marriage and non-consummation of the marriage.
(v) Court had discretion in cases of this nature to grant a divorce. H. John
Perera Vs. H. Mathupali,(1) referred to.
No written submissions were filed by the Counsel for the Defendant-Respondent
contradicting the viewpoints of the Counsel for the Plaintiff-Appellant.
The above said submissions of Counsel for the Plaintiff Appellant would now be
examined.
The learned District Judge has found that there had been a valid marriage. But
there is no doubt that there had been a complete breakdown of the marriage after
registration.
The amended plaint had not placed alternative causes of action. The averments in
the plaint dealt with nullity only. (vide paragraph 7 of the amended plaint).
Yet the second prayer in the amended plaint deals with the granting of a
divorce. Possibly it was inserted on a misunderstanding by the learned
Attorney-at-Law for the plaintiff that a formal granting of a divorce was
necessary after declaration of nullity. A declara-
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tion of nullity would mean the
contract of marriage was ab initio void. A divorce would presuppose the
existence of a valid marriage.
It is the insertion of a prayer for divorce in the amended plaint which has
given rise to the above said submissions of the learned Counsel for the
Plaintiff Appellant.
It is easy to brush the submissions of the learned Counsel for the
Plaintiff-Appellant aside on the basis that no cause of action for divorce was
pleaded in the amended plaint except for nullity.
But it is useful to remember the dictum of Justice de Kretser in H. John Perera
Vs. H. Mathupali (supra) at 465 which reads as follows:
"It appears to me that when a Court is satisfied that the marriage between the
parties is truly at an end it should exercise its discretion with a view to
rehabilitate and not to punish."
The following reasons mentioned by the learned Counsel for the
Plaintiff-Appellant no doubt appear as valid grounds which could have prompted a
Court of First Instance to grant a divorce in a case where a valid marriage has
been established:-
(i) Except for the signing of the Certificate of Marriage, parties had not lived
together.
(ii) There had been no consummation of the marriage.
(iii) The Defendant did not choose to contradict the evidence led by the
Plaintiff on the above two matters. She did not give evidence nor lead any
evidence on her behalf.
Added to these grounds, the parties, we find are desirous to end their marital
bond with no possibility of reconciliation whatsoever in sight.
Willmer L.J. said in Lawry Vs. Lawry(2) at 791 referring to
the order of the Original Court Judge "He had to balance the consideration of
respect for the sanctity of marriage (which is of particular importance in the
present case in view of the
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wife's conscientious objections
to divorce) against the public interest which is involved in the question
whether it is right to keep in being, a marriage which has so obviously and so
hopelessly and completely broken down."
To refuse a divorce in this instance merely because a cause of action had not
been specifically pleaded on a ground of divorce would be to inflict much
punishment mentally as well as financially on the parties.
We are no doubt satisfied on the evidence placed before the Original Court that
there were adequate grounds to grant a divorce if divorce on the ground of
malicious desertion, constructive or otherwise, was pleaded as a cause of
action. Superficially there is in fact a prayer (prayer "b") for the granting of
a divorce.
We therefore confirm the judgment of the learned District Judge in coming to a
finding that there were no grounds established for nullity but set aside his
order dismissing the Plaintiff Appellant's action and granting costs in a sum of
Rs. 2500/= to the Department-Respondent. Instead we order that adequate grounds
having been adduced the marriage entered upon between the parties on 23.01.1992
be set aside and decree nisi be entered by the learned District Judge,
Embilipitiya granting the Plaintiff-Appellant a divorce from the Defendant
-Respondent on the ground of constructive malicious desertion.
Parties shall bear their own costs. Registrar shall forward original record to
the District Court of Embilipitiya without delay.
Judgment that there were no grounds established for nullity confirmed. But order
dismissing Plaintiffs action set aside. Decrees Nisi be entered granting the
plaintiff Appellant a divorce.
TILAKAWARDANE, J. - I agree
Appeal allowed
Divorce granted